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Article 8

A NEW APPROACH TO THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE: TURNING EXCEPTIONS
INTO THE RULE

The status and scope of the Act of State doctrine in United States law
is currently unsettled. The most recent Supreme Court attempt to
define the doctrine, First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba
(Citibank),1 produced opinions by four Justices, each advancing a distinctive interpretation of the role the doctrine should play in cases
involving foreign expropriations of American-owned property. The
Justices' divergence reflected an erosion of the consensus reached
earlier in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,2 where the Court had
held that the Act of State doctrine barred American courts from
questioning the validity of foreign expropriations, even though American property owners had not been compensated. Widespread criticism
of the result in Sabbatino quickly led to congressional legislation in3
tended to modify the Court's strict adherence to the Act of State bar.
As revealed by Citibank, however, the Court still has not been able to
synthesize this congressional directive with case precedent, constitutional considerations, and its own concern for justice, into a workable
and acceptable Act of State doctrine.
After briefly tracing the history of the Act of State doctrine, this Note
will maintain that judicial consideration of the validity of foreign
expropriations is mandated by Congress, condoned by the executive
branch, and compelled by the ambiguous procedures currently in force
which jeopardize the preservation of judicial independence and the
proper "separation of powers." The Note then proposes an available
and eminently practical means by which the judiciary could involve
itself in the evaluation of foreign expropriations: namely, by expanding
the "penal and revenue exception" to the Act of State doctrine. 4 This
solution, which has long oriented inter-state relations within the United

1. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
2. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
3. Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1013, as
amended 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hickenlooper Amendment].
4. The "penal and revenue exception," justifying the refusal of the courts of one
sovereign to enforce the penal and revenue laws of a foreign sovereign, is discussed in
detail in notes 42-63 infra and accompanying text.
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States, would render the doctrine far less of an obstacle to judicial
consideration of the validity of foreign expropriations and would
provide for predictability in an area of law currently in chaos, without
compromising the Constitution or foreign policy.
I
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: AN HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS5

A. EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE

The Act of State doctrine was formulated less than a century ago to
guide American judicial treatment of foreign governmental acts involved in domestic litigation. In Underhill v. Hernandez,6 the Supreme
Court articulated the principle that "the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory."' 7 Although often termed the "classic" statement of
the Act of State doctrine,8 the Underhill opinion is fraught with ambiguities. As one analyst has pointed out, the Court there failed to
establish whether "the source of this rule was to be found in international law, comity, conflicts, or mere political expediency. '"9 Two decades later, however, the Supreme Court, in Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co., identified "comity" as the source of the principle set down in

Underhill:
To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and
perhaps condemned by the Courts of another would very certainly "imperil the
0
amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations."'

That the Court's indisposition to evaluate the validity of foreign acts of
state on this ground had crystallized into an established doctrine 1

5. For an in-depth historical examination of the Act of State doctrine, see Delson, The
Act of State Doctrine-JudicialDeference or Abstention?, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1972); see also
Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959).
6. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
7. Id. at 252.
8. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964).
9. Delson, supra note 5, at 87. Another perplexing aspect of the Underhill decision is
that it concerned an American citizen's tort action against a South American general who
had become head of state at the time of suit. Therefore, the case would seem to turn on
the issue of sovereign immunity rather than the nascent Act of State doctrine. Accord,
Mann, The Sancrosanctity of the ForeignAct of State, 59 L.Q. REV. 42, 49 (1943). See note 11
infra.
10. 246 U.S. 297, 303-304 (1918).
11. 0etjen, not Underhill, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), represents the first unambiguous judicial
reliance upon the Act of State doctrine. Writes Zander, supra note 5, at 831: "[H]ere for
the first time the Court allowed an immunity rationaemateriae in a case where the doctrine
of personal immunity was not available to the defendant."
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appeared certain when in Shepleigh v. Meir, 2 the court subsequently
refused to make such an evaluation, even though the plaintiff charged
a foreign nation with having violated international law.
The Act of State doctrine did not, however, prove to be an absolute
bar to American courts adjudicating the legitimacy of foreign governmental acts. In 1954, in Berstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche

Stoomvart-Maatschappijj,13 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the attemp of a German Jew to recover insurance proceeds for
property which had been confiscated by the Nazi government. In the
course of litigation, the State Department communicated to the court
that it would not object if the court were to rule on the validity of the
4
confiscation in order to decide the state of the title to the property.1
The Second Circuit thereafter held that the Executive communiqu6
had effectively lifted the Act of State bar, and allowed the court to
consider the merits of Bernstein's claim that the court should invalidate
the Nazi confiscation decree and award him title to the property. While
some observers have interpreted Bernstein as holding that the Executive
possesses the prerogative to waive the Act of State doctrine at will,
other analysts have read Bernstein more narrowly, emphasizing that the
court's apparent deference to the State Department's suggestion was
5
limited to the exceptional facts of the case.1
B.

THE SABBATINO INTERLUDE

Fidel Castro's communization of Cuba thrust the Act of State doctrine into the legal limelight once again during the 1960's. When the
United States responded to the deterioration of its relations with Cuba
by reducing the Cuban sugar import quota, Castro immediately expropriated American property and commercial interests in Cuba. The

12. 299 U.S. 468, 471 (1937).
13. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
14. The "Bernstein letter" was prompted by a unique concurrence of circumstances.
First, the United States government had committed itself to the policy of restitution of
property to the victims of Nazi expropriations. This policy would have been frustrated in

Bernstein by the application of the Act of State doctrine. Moreover, in Bernstein the State
Department was seeking judicial waiver of the Act of State doctrine where the sovereign
act at issue was that of a govenment no longer in existence. For an excellent analysis of
Bernstein, see Metzger, The State Department'sRole in the JudicialAdministration of the Act of
State Doctrine, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (1972); see also Delson, supra note 5, at 82 passim.

15. See note 14 supra. Metzger embraces the narrow interpretation of Bernstein,
rejecting "[any conception of Bernstein as a general-purpose license to the Executive to
turn off the judicial act of state doctrine at a twist of the wrist .. " Metzger, supra note
14, at 98.
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first case challenging these expropriations to reach the Supreme Court
was Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.16 The case involved Cuba's
nationalization of Compania-Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey (C.A.V.),
a sugar producing enterprise owned principally by United States citizens. Prior to the expropriation, an importer, Farr, Whitlock, and
Company, had contracted with C.A.V. for sugar to be shipped to Farr,
Whitlock's customers in North Africa. As the sugar was being loaded
onto the exporting vessel, however, Castro nationalized C.A.V. In
order to ensure delivery of the sugar to its customers, Farr, Whitlock
was compelled to enter into a separate purchase contract with the
Cuban authorities. Thus it happened that both Cuba, through its
national bank, Banco Nacional de Cuba, and the New York courtappointed receiver for the assets of C.A.V., Sabbatino, claimed the
proceeds of the shipment of sugar from Farr, Whitlock.
The suit was begun when Banco Nacional sued Sabbatino and Farr,
Whitlock in a New York Federal District Court alleging illegal conversion of the proceeds of the shipment' 7 and requesting an injunction
preventing defendants from exercising dominion over the proceeds.
The District Court denied the relief requested, holding that the
discriminatory, retaliatory, and confiscatory expropriations that had
befallen C.A.V. were violations of international law'" which, since
international law is incorporated into United States law,' 9 must not be
implemented by American courts. 20 After the decision was affirmed on
appeal, 21 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that American courts
must defer to the Act of State doctrine and may not question the acts of

16. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376
U.S. 398 (1964).
17. More precisely, Banco Nacional's suit alleged that Farr, Whitlock had converted
the bill of lading which entitled Banco Nacional to payment for the sugar shipment.
Banco's agent had presented the bill of lading to Farr, Whitlock, who accepted this
document without tendering payment to the agent. Once in possession of the bill of
lading, Farr, Whitlock was persuaded by the C.A.V. not to surrender the bill of lading,
nor to pay the proceeds of the sugar shipment to Banco Nacional, and C.A.V. agreed to
indemnify Farr, Whitlock for any losses which it might sustain in the ensuing litigation.
Thus, the bill of lading became a focal point of the suit. Id., 307 F.2d 845, 850-51 (2d Cir.
1962).
18. Id., 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
19. The District Court cited The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) as
establishing the proposition that international law is incorporated into United States law.

20. For a critical analysis of the lower court opinion, see R. FALK, THE ROLE OF
64-114 (1964). For support of

DoMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

the argument advanced by the lower court, see Brief for the American Bar Association as
Amicus Curiae, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
21. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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a foreign sovereign carried out within its own territory. Writing for the
majority, Justice Harlan explained that the Act of State doctrine was
conclusive in such situations, but not because of any inherent notions of
22
sovereignty, nor even because of the dictates of international law.
Instead, Harlan described the Act of State doctrine as having:
. . . "constitutional" underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships
between branches of government in a system of separation of powers.... The
doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of
foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of
goals both for itself 23and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere.

In short, the Court's continued' adherence to the Act of State doctrine
derived from its fear of impinging on the Executive's prerogatives in
the area of foreign relations and its concern for preserving a proper
24

separation of powers.
Many observers were upset, not only because the Supreme Court had
apparently left American investors so vulnerable to foreign expropriations, but because, moreover, Cuba was allowed to use an American
court as the vehicle to obtain the proceeds from the very property it
had taken from United States citizens. While the case was being
considered on remand from the Supreme Court, Congress swifty
passed the Hickenlooper Amendment, 25 expressing therein its intent
to reverse the Sabbatino result in future Sabbatino-like situations. The
Amendment directs American courts to ignore the Act of State doctrine when the foreign act under consideration violates international
law, providing the Executive does not explicity advise that American
foreign interests mandate the application of the Act of State doctrine.
In accordance with this directive, the district court hearing Sabbatino on
remand waited sixty days for a possible Presidential communication.

22. "Thus, the Court disavowed the previous rationale stated in the Oetjen and Ricaud
cases which said that the doctrine was based upon principles of international law and
comity." Note, The Confusing State of the Act of State Doctrine, 22 J. PUB. L. 203, 207-208
(1973).
23. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
24. Emphasizing this theme, Harlan declared in Sabbatino that the "continuing vitality"
of the Act of State doctrine ".. . depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution
of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters
bearing upon foreign affairs." Id., at 427-28.
25. Hickenlooper Amendment, supra note 3. See S. REA,. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 24 (1964); 110 CONG. REc. 195,551 (1964); Note, Act of State-ExpropriationsSabbatino Amendment Did Not Eliminate Use of Act of State Doctrineas a Bar to Recoupment of
Losses by New York Bank of Its PropertyExpropriatedby Cuba, I1 VA. J. INT'L L. 406 (1971).
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When none was forthcoming, the court applied the Hickenlooper
Amendment and rendered judgment in favor of the American sugar
owners. 2 6 In affirming this decision, however, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals greatly limited the application of the Hickenlooper
Amendment, finding that it pertained only to situations in which
property expropriated from American citizens is actually brought into
27
the United States.
C. BEYOND SABBATINO: FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK
AND CONFUSION

First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,28 (Citibank), also
arising as a consequence of Castro's nationalizations, presented the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to re-examine its treatment in
Sabbatino of the Act of State doctrine. When the Cuban government
expropriated property belonging to Citibank, the bank responded by
declaring a loan it had made to Cuba to be in default. By selling the
loan collateral, Citibank realized $1.8 million in excess of the amount
due on the loan. Cuba, again through Banco Nacional de Cuba, sued
Citibank to recover the excess collateral. Citibank counterclaimed for
the value of the property expropriated by Cuba, arguing that the $1.8
million should be set-off against the damages in the counterclaim.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the complexity and
uncertainty of precedent relating to the Act of State doctrine had
already been underscored by contradictory lower court rulings, with
Banco Nacional prevailing in the Court of Appeals. 29 Moreover, while
26. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d
166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968). For more detailed study of Sabbatino
on remand and the Hickenlooper Amendment, see Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967).
27. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 172 passim (2d Cir. 1967). See also
French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 295 N.Y.2d 433, 242 N.E.2d 704
(1966), in which the Hickenlooper Amendment was held not to bar the application of the
Act of State doctrine since the plaintiff's loss was due to an alleged breach of promise,
and the Hickenlooper Amendment was construed by the court only to cover confiscations
and other takings.
28. 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 400
U.S. 1019 (1971), on remand, 422 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759 (1972),
rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 897 (1972).
29. At the trial level, id., 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the district court
acknowledged the Act of State doctrine, but ruled that the Hickenlooper Amendment
controlled so that the doctrine did not bar the court from evaluating the validity of the
Cuban expropriation. The Second Circuit reversed, id., 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970),
thereby following its decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1966), and holding that the Hickenlooper Amendment applied only where the actual
property expropriated had entered the United States and was the subject of the suit.
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the Supreme Court considered Citibank, the Legal Advisor to the State

Department informed the Court that the Executive would not object if
the Court were to ignore the Act of State doctrine and decide the case

on its merits. 30 The State Department's action prompted the Court to
vacate the judgment below and remand Citibank to the Second Circuit

for reconsideration. 31 The Second Circuit adhered to its earlier position, however, refusing to let the so-called "Bernstein exception" con-

trol. 32 On reappeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held for
Citibank, although the three opinions written by members of the
majority premised this result on differing rationales.3 3 Indeed, the
three majority opinions and the opinion of the four dissenters left
many questions pertaining to the Act of State doctrine in doubt. Most
significantly, perhaps, six of the nine Justices rejected the notion that
the Act of State doctrine could be waived by the Executive, thereby
enabling courts to pass judgment on the validity of foreign expropriations in certain cases. But no other concrete legal guidelines are
discernible from Citibank due to the lack of any further consensus. As
one commentator has appropriately remarked: "The effect of the
Court's ruling is about the same as if it had denied certiorari.

34

Undoubtedly, future judicial treatment of foreign expropriations has
been rendered unpredictable by the uncertainty of the Citibank hold35
ing
30. This letter is reprinted in an appendix to the second opinion of the Court of

Appeals in Citibank, 422 F.2d 530, 536 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Note, Executive Suggestion
and Act of State Cases: Implications of the Stevenson Letter in the Citibank Case, 12 HARV. INT'L

L.J. 557 (1971).
31. 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
32. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
33. Briefly stated, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist took the
position that application of the Act of State doctrine is justified only as a tool to protect
the executive branch from being embarrassed by judicial review of the acts of a foreign
sovereign. Where the Executive advises a court that judicial review would not be
embarrassing, as was done in Citibank, then the Act of State doctrine does not prohibit
judicial consideration of the foreign act in question insofar as set-offs or counterclaims
are concerned. Justice Douglas based his opinion on National City Bank of New York v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), in which the Court had allowed the defendant to
counterclaim against a sovereign plaintiff despite the latter's assertion of sovereign
immunity. Justice Powell, on the other hand, premised his opinion on the contention that
Sabbatino should be overruled. Powell denied that official acts of foreign states deserve
mechanical exemptions from judicial review. Rather, he posited the Executve should be
made to satisfy a heavy burden of proof that judicial consideration of an act in question
would jeopardize its foreign policy interests. For a more detailed summary of the three
majority opinions in Citibank, see Lowenfeld, Act of State and Department of State: First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795, 799-803 (1972).

34. Lowenfeld, id., at 803.
35. In trying to piece together some concrete holding with precedential value in
Citibank, one observer has concluded that the case permits judicial evaluations of the

280
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II
THE ARGUMENT FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE
VALIDITY OF FOREIGN EXPROPRIATIONS

A.

THE MANDATE TO DEPART FROM SABBATINO

The Justices in the Citibank majority made efforts, albeit unconcerted
ones, to mitigate the strict Act of State barrier that was set down in
Sabbatino. The majority's disaffection with the Sabbatino approach was
surely warranted. In the intervening period since Sabbatino, Congress
had emphatically expressed its desire that the judiciary pass judgment
on the validity of foreign expropriations, first by speedily enacting the
Hickenlooper Amendment in 1964, and later by reaffirming its support for the policy expressed therein in 1970.6 Certainly, these legislative directives to the courts were legitimate exercises of Congressional
power.
Moreover, the Act of State doctrine has itself long been
riddled with "exceptions." One commentator has counted nine
loopholes which might enable a court to sidestep the Act of State
doctrine in certain situations.3" That the Act of State barrier was never
validity of foreign expropriations when three factors are present: (1) an indication by the
State Department that application of the Act of State doctrine will not promote American

foreign policy interests; (2) an independent court ruling that such judicial involvement
will not interfere with the Executive's conduct of foreign relations; and (3) a counterclaim
challenging the expropriation as a violation of international law has been filed against the
sovereign plaintiff seeking damages not higher than those claimed by the sovereign. See
Note, 86 HARV. L. REV. 284, 285 (1973). However, it appears that the conclusion of
Professor Lowenfeld, discussed at note 34 supra and accompanying text, is more accurate
in its appraisal of Citibank's lack of precedential value.
36. Hickenlopper Amendment, supra note 3. "The Second Hickenlooper Amendment
was intended to overrule the Supreme Court in Sabbatino," writes Professor Henkin, even
though "the statute does not give a clear idea as to what is left after the Supreme Court is
overruled." Henkin, supra note 26, at 180.

37. Henkin, supra note 26, at 177, explains:
The federal courts in Farr upheld the [Hickenlooper] Amendment as a valid
exercise of Congressional power. The Supreme Court, if it were to deal with the
issue, would probably agree, since the legislation seems clearly to be within the

express power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations as well as
the implied power of Congress over foreign affairs.
See also Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign
Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 920 et. seq. (1959).

38. The commentator identifies several "arguable" exceptions to the Act of State
doctrine implicit in Sabbatino, such as those which may be operative when: "(1) the
foreign state is at war with the United States, (2) the foreign state is not recognized by the
United States, (3) the suit is brought to enforce a foreign state's penal or revenue laws.
.

. .

Note, Act of State Doctrine-FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,

49 WAsH. L. REv. 213, 223. Other possible exceptions listed in the Note involve
the non-existence of the foreign government at the time of suit, the illegality of the
sovereign's act according to the sovereign's own laws, the applicability of a treaty to the
controversy, and a "clear" violation of international law. The author of this list gets
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absolute is suggested by the very existence of these exceptions. They
have never been logically articulated from the bench, however, and
their haphazard application has contributed to the confusion currently
generated by the uncertain status of the doctrine. Most importantly,
the Executive Branch has at times been willing to let American courts
pass judgment on the validity of foreign expropriations, as evidenced
by the State Department letters in Bernstein and Citibank, and by other

official policy pronouncements.3 9 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's opinion
in Citibank, endorsed by two otherJustices, ascribes to the Executive the
power to decree whether an expropriation will be adjudicated on its
40
merits or be unconditionally legitimated by the Act of State doctrine.
This last procedure is an intolerable encroachment of the judicial
domain, 4 1 which can be corrected only if the courts recognize their
legitimate authority to pass judgment on the validity of foreign expropriations without first obtaining Executive permission.
B.

THE LOOPHOLE: THE NoN-ENFORCEABILITY OF FOREIGN
PENAL AND REVENUE LAWS

There is a ready and practical means available by which to involve
the judiciary in evaluating the validity of foreign expropriations without any undue affront to the Executive. It arises from the longstanding Anglo-American rule that courts need not enforce the penal
or revenue laws of foreign sovereigns. 42 A major influence in the
determination of interstate relations within the United States, this rule
has been acknowledged as well at the international level by American

somewhat carried away, improperly identifying the absence of several conditions precedent to the operation of the Act of State doctrine as constituting "exceptions" to the
doctrine.
39. Lowenfeld suggests that the Executive cbuld decide to protect U.S. investors by
always writing a Bernstein-style "do adjudicate" letter, a speculation by no means implausible in light of recent Executive statements. See Lowenfeld, supra note 33, at 809, citing
Economic Assistance and Investment Security in Developing Nations, Jan. 19, 1972, 8 WEEKLY
CoMP. PREs. Docs. 64 (1972).
40. See note 33, supra.
41. This point is developed in Metzger, supra note 14, at 101.
42. Chief Justice Marshall expressed this policy forthrightly: "The courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another, .... " The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 337,
344 (1825). A more recent articulation of the policy of the non-enforceability of foreign
fiscal laws employs the equally direct language: "... . it is well established since the days
of Lord Mansfield . . . that one State does not enforce the revenue laws of another."
Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 239 N.Y.S.2d
872, 875, 190 N.E.2d 235, 237 (1963). Accord, City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d
401, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188, 184 N.E.2d 167 (1962), 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 144B
(Lauterpacht ed. 1947). See notes 45-47 infra.
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courts. However, although at times identified as an "exception" to the
Act of State doctrine, 43 this basis of non-enforceability has generally
been ineffectual in the disposition of cases involving the doctrine. By
expanding this exception to encompass Act of State situations, courts
would render the doctrine far less of an obstacle to consistent judicial
consideration of the validity of foreign expropriations.
In Huntington v. Attrill,4 4 the Supreme Court first established the
proposition that a forum state need not grant full faith and credit to
judgments rendered by the courts of sister states which were based on
statutes essentially "penal" in character.4 5 The Court in that case set
down the still-prevailing test for state courts to follow in determining
whether a particular statute is "penal" and therefore unenforceable
outside the enacting state's borders:
The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects may be
called penal, is a penal law in the internationalsense, so that it cannot be enforced
in the courts of another State, depends upon the question whether its purpose is
to punish an offense against the publicjustice of the State,
or to afford a private
*
remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act. "

43. See note 38, supra.
44. 146 U.S. 657 (1892). Accord, Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290
(1888).
45. This principle was squarely reaffirmed in a recent Supreme Court decision, Nelson
v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970). There the Court stated: "Since the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require that sister States enforce a foreign penal judgment,
Huntington v. Attril ... c.f. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935).
. . ." The Court goes on to conclude in a footnote on the same page: "The Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require California to enforce the North Carolina penal judgment
in any way." Accord, Sellers v. State, 48 Ala. App. 178, 263 So. 2d 156 (1972); Buckley v.
Huston, 60 N.J. 472, 291 A.2d 134 (1972). See also Am. JUR. 2d, Forfeituresand Penalties
§§ 10-11 (1968). For a description of court treatment of penal and revenue laws, see
Stoel, The Enforcement of Foreign Non-criminal Penal and Revenue Judgments in England and
the United States, 16 INT'L & Cocm. L.Q. 663 (1967). For a discussion of judicial treatment
of foreign revenue laws, see Cohen, Non-enforcement of Foreign Tax Laws and the Act of State
Doctrine: A Conflict in Judicial Foreign Policy, 11 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1970).
46. Huntington v. Attrill, supra note 44, at 673-74 (emphasis added). Accord, Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 103, 120 N.E. 198, 199 (1918). In a comprehensive
article, Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV.
193, 197 (1932), Professor Leflar lists a variety of statutes at times deemed penal,
including: statutes making delinquent corporate officers liable for corporate debts (e.g.
Nesbitt v. Clark, 272 Pa. 161, 116 A. 404 (1922)), wrongful-death acts prescribing
minimums of recovery regardless of the actual loss sustained (e.g. Cristally v. Warner, 87
Conn. 461, 88 A. 711 (1913)), and even common law exemplary damages (e.g. Grinestaff
v. N.Y. Central R.R., 253 Il1. App. 589 (1929)). A recent example of a state court's refusal
to enforce a sister state's penal statute is found in Carterv. Department of Public Safety, 290
A.2d 652 (Del. Super. 1972) where the court ruled that a Delaware court could not
revoke the driver's license of a Delaware citizen when informed by Maryland authorities
that the citizen had been convicted in Maryland for a driving infraction, since the
conviction was based on a penal law.
It should be noted, however, that there is a trend away from such broad constructions
of what constitutes non-enforceable penal and revenue laws, precipitated in large part by
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The Supreme Court also formerly suggested that sister state revenue
or tax laws should be accorded similar treatment by state courts.4"
While the Court subsequently modified this latter position,48 it has left
open the question of whether a court need enforce the tax claims of
sister states that have not been reduced to judgment. 49 In any event,
the principle that state penal and revenue laws may not be enforced by
the courts of sister states has played an important role in ordering
50
inter-state relations.
At the international level, the rule that foreign penal and revenue
laws need not be enforced by American courts has been recognized by
courts and legal scholars alike. 51 Banco do Brasil v. A.C. Israel Commodity

Professor Leflar's ultimate conclusions condemning "the absolute exclusion of extrastate
Leflar, supra, at 225. See,
claims on account of their penal or governmental nature ....
e.g., James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1927), in which the
Supreme Court held that a state statute providing for exemplary damages was non-penal
and therefore enforceable in the courts of a sister state. See also Holbein v. Rigot, 245
So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1971). This trend is discussed fully at note 50, infra.
47. The Court held:
The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another
applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors,
but to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for
any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue ...
Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888). See Cohen, Non-enforcement
of Foreign Tax Laws and the Act of State Doctrine: A Conflict in Judicial Foreign Policy, supra
note 45.
48. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
49. Several states, especially New York, cling very strongly to a broad nonenforceability of revenue laws principle. See e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11
N.Y.2d 401, 406, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191, 184 N.E.2d 167, 169 (1962). But see City of New
York v. Shapiro, 129 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass. 1954); Ohio Department of Taxation v.
Kleitch Bros., 357 Mich. 504, 98 N.W.2d 636 (1959). A majority of state legislatures have
now passed statutes requiring their courts to enforce the valid tax claims of those sister
states which have enacted reciprocal legislation. R. CRAMTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF
LAws 136 (1968).
50. This Note advocates the expanded application of the non-enforceability principle
between international sovereigns, the legitimacy of which is little affected by reconsiderations of the rule as applied among the fifty United States. The state experience with the
principle of non-enforceability is presented primarily as an example of how this rule can
and should be applied by the United States courts when encountering a case involving the
penal or tax laws of a foreign nation.
51. Significantly, it has been argued by a number of judges and scholars that this
principle is more appropriate to international sovereign relationships than to those
among the states of the Union. See e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 1127-28, 193 S.W.2d 919, 927 (1946), in which the court
remarked that the non-enforceability principle was justified solely
... as between wholly sovereign states. It has no place in a union of states such as the
United States, where the interests of both the state and the taxpayer will be
protected from arbitrary power by the provisions of the federal constitution
(emphasis added).
See also R. CRAMTON & D. CURRIE, supra note 49, at 121-38; W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (1966); P. ADRIAANSE, CONFISCATIONS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1956).
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Company52 illustrates how courts have at times applied this principle
when considering claims involving foreign revenue laws. In that case,
the court rejected Brazil's claim that it had been defrauded by the
defendant's circumvention of Brazilian currency regulations. The court
stated:
Plaintiff is an instrumentality of the Government of Brazil and is seeking, by use
of an action for conspiracy to defraud, to enforce what is clearly a revenue law
.... it is well established since the day of Lord Mansfield (citations
omitted) that
3
one state does not enforce the revenue laws of another.5

In a more recent decision, Menendez v. Saks and Co., the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals boldly affirmed this principle, relying in part
upon Banco do Brasil.5 4 By characterizing the foreign statutes at issue as
revenue laws, American courts have thus been able to rule against
plaintiffs with causes of action founded on otherwise proper and
operative foreign laws.
Despite the clarity of reasoning and results in Banco do Brasil and
Menendez, the penal and revenue exception has had little influence on
how American courts treat foreign expropriations. The majority in
Sabbatino gave some consideration to the defandants' contention
that "a court need not give effect to the penal or revenue laws of
foreign countries or sister states. '55 While the Court specifically refused
to resolve the general status of the "penal and revenue exception" to
the Act of State doctrine, however, it rejected the defendants' argument on the ground that it found "no authority which suggests that the
doctrine reaches a public law which, as here, has been fully executed
within the foreign state. 56n In a strong dissent, Justice White criticized
52. 12 N.Y.2d 371, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 190 N.E.2d 235 (1963).
53. Id. at 377, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 875, 1.90 N.E.2d at 237.
54. "Currency laws are but a species of revenue laws, c.f. Banco do Brasil . . . . As a
general rule, one nation will not enforce the revenue laws of another, see Colorado v.
Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921) . . ." Menendez v. Saks and Co., 485 F.2d
1355, 1366 (2d Cir. 1973). Like Banco do Brasil,Menendez also concerned the attempt of a
foreign litigant to convince an American court to compel compliance with foreign
currency regulations by United States businessmen. In addition, Menendez presented an
Act of State issue, the resolution of which, however, did not involve the application of the
principle of non-enforceability of foreign fiscal laws.
55. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 414 (1964).
56. The Court's refusal to resolve definitely the status of the penal and revenue laws
argument vis-a-vis the Act of State doctrine in Sabbatino is reflected in the statement in id.
at 414: "The extent to which this doctrine [the non-enforceability of foreign penal and
revenue laws] may apply to other kinds of public laws, though perhaps still an open
question, need not be decided in this case." Because of the cursory manner by which the
majority disposed of the defendants' argument, analysts have been left with little to guide
their judgments regarding application of the penal or revenue exceptions. See e.g., Note,
Adherence of the U.S.S.R. to the Universal Copyright Convention, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 82
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this conclusion, proposing instead that foreign confiscations should be
treated as penal or revenue laws which bar the application of the Act of
State doctrine. 57 Expressing confidence that such an alternative to the
Act of State doctrine would protect the Executive from being embarrassed by judicial interference in foreign affairs, White sternly chided
the majority for failing to apply what he considered to be a well
established and appropriate legal principle.5 8
White's dissent in Sabbatino, endorsed by Powell in Citibank,59 focuses
on what is judicially defined and conventionally recognized as a penal
law. As Justice (then Judge) Cardozo once declared, a penal statute
"within the rules of private international law ... is one that awards a
penalty to the state .... The purpose must be not reparation to one
aggrieved, but vindication of the public justice. '' 60 Clearly, the Cuban

expropriation decrees which generated the disputes in Sabbatino and

(1974), in which the writer found the majority treatment of the penal law question too
vague to be helpful in predicting whether American courts will permit the Soviet Union
to claim copyright privileges in the United States based on Soviet decrees "nationalizing"
such copyright interests, or whether American courts would deem such an expropriatory
decree to be a penal law and therefore unenforceable. Another commentator has argued
that Sabbatino "left open the issue whether the failure to pay compensation was such an
act of state as to come within the act of state doctrine." Note, Does Failure to Pay
Compensationfor ExpropriatedPropertyCome Within the Act of State Doctrine?, 66 AM. J. INT'L

L. 823, 827 (1972). The writer conducted a brief exegesis of what the Court squarely
held in Sabbatino and Citibank, and, although he did not mention the penal and revenue
exception argument propounded herein, he reached a similar conclusion: viz. that courts
need not abstain from judging the validity of foreign expropriations because of traditional notions of the Act of State doctrine.
57. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964).
58. White maintained that a mechanical presumption of invalidity regarding foreign
confiscatory decrees would adequately protect the executive branch from judicial interference in foreign relations. He reasoned (Id. at 450 n. 11) that all foreign revenue laws
are irrebuttably presumed invalid to avoid embarrassing the Executive, so that it would
only be natural to accord similar treatment to expropriatory laws. Moreover, White
highlighted the majority's acknowledgement of the conventional rule that United States
courts need not enforce foreign penal and revenue laws, asserting that this principle is
operative despite the politically charged nature of the disputes in which it is often
applied. Therefore, courts should deny effect to confiscatory laws, even though the issue
is suffused in politics and the "enacting country has a large stake in the decision .. "
White concluded that the Court should have remedied the logical inconsistency of
denying enforcement of foreign tax judgments on one hand, while simultaneously giving
effect to foreign expropriations on the other:
[I]t is difficult, conceptually or otherwise, to distinguish between the situation
where a tax judgment secured in a foreign country against one who is in the
country at the time of the judgment is presented to an American court, and the
situation where a confiscatory decree is sought to be enforced in American
courts.
Id.

59. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 774 (1972).
60. 224 N.Y. 99, 102-3, 120 N.E. 198, 199 (1918).
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Citibank were conceived of and executed as "vindications of the public
justice. '61 Cuba was protecting public, not private, rights through the
nationalizations and, as such, the decrees implementing them should
have been categorized as penal laws. 62 Moreover, scholarly writing
tends to support Justice White's conclusion. One commentator, analyzing the district and appellate courts' original treatment of Sabbatino, has
suggested that the courts
might have relied upon the retaliatoy and discriminatoy features of the Cuban
decree in order to apply the well known conflicts rule that the courts of one
jurisdiction will not enforce foreign penal or fiscal laws. The characterization of
the Cuban laws as "penal" might have been reached alternatively by a demonstration of its confiscatory nature.6 3

C. DISTINGUISHING THE PENAL EXCEPTION FROM "PUBLIC
POLICY" IN ACT OF STATE CASES: THE ADVANTAGES
OF UTILIZING THE PENAL EXCEPTION

Probably the most widely recognized of all the so-called exceptions to
the Act of State doctrine is that based on public policy. Generally, if the
enforcement of the foreign act of state would be repugnant to a
sovereign's public policy, courts of that sovereign may refuse to enforce

or give effect to such state action. 64 A British scholar has concluded
that the British public policy exception subsumes the penal exception,
depriving the latter of its own independent vitality and force.6 5 While
acknowledging that both exceptions do share some of the same policy
justifications, important differences exist which underscore the value of
perceiving the penal exception as a distinct concept.
American courts are likely to regard case by case determination of
public jolicy as an "unruly horse,' 66 as, in fact, it may well be. Public

61. That Castro conceived the program of expropriation of American interests in
Cuba as a "vindication of the public justice" is evident in his public statements responding
to the American reduction of the Cuban sugar import quota. Vowing "Cuba cannot be
brought to its knees by economic aggression," N.Y. Times, July 8, 1960, at 2, col. 3,
Castro proceeded to expropriate United States sugar interests as a response to what was
viewed as an American threat to the welfare of the Cuban people.
62. Alternatively, it would be by no means implausible if such expropriatory decrees
were characterized as revenue laws, since they prescribe the surrender of private
property to the public treasury or for public use. See the discussion of Banco do Brasil,
notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
63. FALK, supra note 20, at 85 (emphasis in original).
64. ADRIAANSE, supra note 51, at 81.
65. A. DicEY & J. MoRIus, CONFLICT OF LAWS 230 (8th ed. 1967).
66. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 859 n.25 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd
on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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policy arguments often involve courts in political and ideological debates outside the normal domain of the judiciary, as well as beyond the
general expertise of most judges. Faced with these possibilities, courts
may understandably opt to define public policy regarding expropriations according to established principles of international law. Indeed,
writers who argue that "public policy" should render justiciable the
67
validity of expropriation without compensation adopt this approach.
Such arguments usually assert that the Cuban expropriations were
discriminatory, retaliatory, and confiscatory, and as such were contrary
68
to international law and should not have been enforced by the courts.
However, as was duly noted by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino: "There
are few, if any, issues in international law today on which opinion
seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens."6 9 Therefore, a party's assertion of the
failure of the expropriating state to compensate him for a taking can
70
no longer establish a per se violation of international law.

Unlike the public policy approach which invites extensive judicial
discretion and operates within an unsettled area of international law,
the penal and revenue exception would provide American courts with
an essentially mechanical rule with which to evaluate foreign expropriations. A foreign expropriatory decree would be deemed penal if "its
purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice. 17 1 Expro-

priatory decrees shown to be "discriminatory, retaliatory, or confisca-

67. Note, New Indications ofJusticiability of American Claims Against CubanExpropriations,
52 B.U.L. REv. 847, 864 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Indications of Justiciability].
68. The lower court in Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), followed this
approach, which is also articulated in the Brief for the American Bar Association as
Amicus Curiae at 5-6, prepared for Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398

(1964).
69. 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
70. Indeed, trying to prove a violation of United States public policy in order to
preclude American courts from granting effect to foreign expropriations would seem to
present a formidable task. In light of the Supreme Court pronouncement regarding the
uncertainty of international law in this area, id., one wonders what facts must now be

proved to win on a public policy argument. For example, a party might contend that
court implementation of a foreign expropriation law involving property not taken for a

valid public purpose violates United States public policy, as was suggested by President'
Nixon's statement on investment security. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
Even if a court were to accept this statement as illustrative of United States public policy,
the expropriating nation would seem to have a myriad of "valid public purposes" with
which to justify a taking, thereby rendering its opponents' chances of proving the public
policy assertion extremely difficult.
71. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
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tory" would easily be categorized as penal under this standard. 72 The
consistent application of this rule would minimize the need for judges
to make discretionary rulings which might offend foreign sovereigns or
embarrass the. Executive.7 3 One need only examine the extensive experience among the several states in administering the penal and
revenue rule to be convinced that this approach is not a disguised
moral judgment by one sovereign of another sovereign's policies; nor is
it likely to be interpreted as such.

CONCLUSION: UNWINDING THE TWISTED STATUS QUO

The rule that a court need not enforce the penal or revenue laws of a
sister state provides an available and practical means by which the
judiciary can involve itself in the consideration of the validity of foreign
expropriations. This principle has played an important role in interstate relations within the United States, and has been recognized by the
United States at the international level as well.7 4 The rule has not been
extended, however, to apply to questions relating to the justiciability of
foreign expropriations because of the influence of the Act of State
doctrine in that area. Current conceptions of the Act of State doctrine
which purport to legitimate Executive involvement in the adjudicatory
process undermine our system of separation of powers and compel the
reassertion of judicial independence in this field. Executive involve-

72. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 58, supra, for Justice White's explanation that the penal approach would
not embarrass the Executive.
74. Surely, relying upon the penal and revenue exception would hardly shock or insult
other nations, since it merely represents the incorporation into our own law of principles
most nations recognize. Although the Supreme Court ruled in Sabbatino that there is no
established international law regarding the duty to compensate victims of expropriations,
Professor Mann has argued that such a duty is nevertheless recognized, even among
Communist nations. He wrote:
Almost all recent confiscators have framed their legislation so as to contemplate
the payment of compensation... What these confiscators have failed to do is to
pay compensation, to implement the promise made and the obligation assumed
by their own legislation, to comply with the duty they recognized ... [There is
no reason why other States should not take the text of the confiscators'
legislation at face value and should impute to them the intention to deny the
international rule, when they merely intend to break it.
Mann, The Legal Consequences of Sabbatino, 51 VA. L. REv. 604, 617 (1965). Accord, G.A.
Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), which asserts that
alien victims of expropriation are entitled to "appropriate compensation . . . in accordance with international law."
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ment is by no means required by the Act of State doctrine.7 5 By
recognizing the penal and revenue exception, courts could consistently
and impartially apply a standardized rule when evaluating the validity
of foreign acts of state, thereby restoring desirable predictability to an
area of the law regrettably subject to the dictates of political expe76
diency.
This is not to say that the Executive, in its desire to further the
nation's foreign policy interests, would be rendered powerless to affect
the outcome of specific expropriation cases. If the Executive branch
wished to guarantee a certain result, a treaty or executive agreement
could be negotiated to establish the validity of particular foreign acts of
state, which American courts would then have to recognize as the
"supreme law of the land." This suggested procedure would merely
ensure that each branch of government would operate within its own
constitutionally prescribed domain, and would prevent the Executive
from undermining judicial independence by involving itself in the
adjudicatory process.
Clifford Michael Greene

75. As Delson, supra note 5, at 82, has observed:
[I]f the act of state doctrine is interpreted as merely mandating judicial deference to Executive suggestions, the major purpose of the doctrine-securing the
separation of powers of the judicial and political branches of governmentwould be defeated ...

Thus, to construe the act of state doctrine as compelling

such judicial deference to political decisions [i.e., letting the act of state doctrine
only serve to further our policy interests] would be to ignore the purpose of the
doctrine in securing the separation of powers.
76. As one writer put it, "[Als courts are able to deal with established guidelines for
resolving a controversy, they are less likely to defer to the political branches for the
settlement of a controversy." Indications of Justiciability, supra note 67, at 886.

